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Abstract This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs 
through all uses of quotation marks that involve reference to expressions is pure quotation, in 
which an expression formed by enclosing an expression in quotation marks refers to the enclosed 
expression.  We defend a version of the so-called disquotational theory of pure quotation and show 
how this device is used in direct discourse and attitude attributions, in exposition in scholarly 
contexts, and in so-called mixed quotation in indirect discourse and attitude attributions.  	
In quotation not only does language turn on itself, but it does so 
word by word and expression by expression, and this reflexive 
twist is inseparable from the convenience and universal 
applicability of the device.   
   –Donald Davidson 
 
1 Introduction 
Quotation is easy to understand but hard to explain.  In this paper, we offer a semantics for the 
varieties of quotation listed in (1)-(5).  
 
(1)  “Boston” contains six letters. 
(2) “psychology” literally means “the study of the soul.” 
(3) (a) He said, “Get serious, boy.” 
(b) She said, “Gorse is common in Scotland”; she did not say, “Furze is common in 
Scotland.” 
(c) Caesar literally said, “Veni, Vidi, Vici,” not “I came, I saw, I conquered.” 
(d) He said, ‘All mimsy were the borogroves,” but didn’t have anything in mind by it. 
(e) Then Jesus said to them, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the 
things that are God's.” 
  (f) “Good morning! it was kind of you to push the chair up that hill ... I hope it wasn't heavy 
for you,” said Connie, looking back at the keeper outside the door. 
(g) Davidson said, “Quotation is a device used to refer to typographical … shapes by 
exhibiting samples.”   
(h) “And what is the use of a book," thought Alice, "without pictures or conversation?” 
(i) “If I had a child!” she thought to herself; “if I had him inside me as a child!” 
 (4) (a) In this chapter, Mill attempts to delineate when the authority of society can rightly limit 
individuality and the "sovereignty of the individual over himself." 
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(b) Berkeley’s objective in the New Theory of Vision was “to shew the manner wherein we 
perceive by sight the distance, magnitude, and situation of objects. Also to consider the 
difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and touch, and whether there be any idea 
common to both senses” (NTV §1). 
(c) They substituted, as Kant has pointed out, “a physiology of the human understanding” 
for the Critical investigation of the claims of reason, and anthropology for ethics.  
(5) (a) Macomber said that he “bolted like a rabbit.”  
(b) Alice said that she had “heard nonsense” compared with which that would be “as 
sensible as a dictionary.”  
(c) She said that it had been many years since “such trifles had broke across the web of 
[her] solitude.”   
(d) Rochefoucauld said that jealousy “ends as soon as we pass from suspicion to certainty.” 
(e) Professor Elugardo said that Williams James said that religious leaders are “creatures 
of exalted emotional sensibility.”  
 (f) She thought that it was curious that that “thin, proud man” should have had “that little, 
sharp woman for a mother!” 
 
(1) is an instance of pure quotation.1  (2) involves pure quotation in its first appearance and 
arguably a dual use-mention (to be explained below) in its second appearance.  Examples in (3a-
g) illustrate direct discourse.  (3a) is an instance of the use of quotation in dialogue in which 
understanding the quoted material is essential to its linguistic function (as is made clear by the fact 
that in translation dialogue inside quotation marks is translated as well).  However, (3b) illustrates 
a strict use of direct discourse that requires the use of the words used by the subject.  (3c-d) 
illustrate a strict use in which the function of the report does not require its speaker to understand 	
1 The term ‘pure quotation’ was introduced into the contemporary semantic literature on quotation 
by Cappelan and Lepore (1997), who contrast it with direct (3a-g) and indirect speech, and mixed 
cases of direct and indirect speech (5a-e).  They are picking up on a distinction drawn in (Davidson 
1979), where Davidson contrasts the idea of quotation used to mention an expression that is not 
itself used with what he calls mixed cases of use and mention.  It is the first half of this contrast 
that Cappelen and Lepore have in mind, namely, the use of quotation marks around an expression 
to form an expression that refers to the enclosed expression, which is not at the same time used, 
and which functions “like a single word” (Davidson 1979, p. 3).  More precisely, what we have in 
mind is given by (Q) below.  This is the predominant use of the term ‘pure quotation’ in the 
literature on quotation.  For a different suggestion about what contrast should be drawn with ‘pure 
quotation’ see (Saka 2013)—though contrast (Maier 2014) writing for the same journal a year 
later.  Saka claims it is “an analytic truth that all quotations that are not mixed must be pure” and 
so includes direct speech under ‘pure quotation’.  But it should be noted that Cappelen and Lepore 
introduce the term stipulatively, so what counts as an analytic truth with regard to the usage they 
introduce depends on what meaning they give it.  Our view about the relations between these 
various uses of quotation marks will emerge in the sequel. 
PREPRINT		
In	The	Semantics	and	Pragmatics	of	Quotation,	eds.	Paul	Saka	and	Michael	Johnson,	Springer	2018:	99-134.	 3	
the words attributed to its subject, or, in the case of (3d), that it have any meaning at all.  (To avoid 
confusion in discussion of direct and indirect discourse, we will use ‘speaker’ for the utterer of a 
sentence and ‘subject’ for the person the sentence is about.)  In contrast, (3e) is an instance of 
direct speech in which the quoted words are a translation from the Greek of the Gospel of Mark, 
which in turn translate the Aramaic of Jesus, and understanding them is essential to its function. 
(3f-g) exhibit the use of ellipsis (in different ways in each) and exclamation marks in reported 
speech (in (3f)), and highlight the need to make sense of punctuation marks inside quotation marks 
in an account of the function of quotation in dialogue and direct speech.  (3h-i) are examples of 
the use of quotation in the analog of direct speech for the attribution of thought.  (4a-b) exhibit 
uses of quotation in scholarly exposition in which there is a dual use-mention.  (4c) shows a use in 
which the quoted material is a translation of the original German.  (5a-c) are examples of “mixed 
quotation” in which quotation marks are used in the complement clauses of indirect discourse.  
(5b) raises the problem of how to handle multiple instances.  (5c) raises the question of how to 
handle interpolations—authorial brackets—that adjust context sensitive terms to the speaker’s 
context.  (5d) shows an example in which the quoted material is a translation of the original.  (5e) 
raises the problem of iterated mixed quotation.  (5f) shows these issues extend to attitude 
attributions.   
We argue that pure quotation is what unifies all of these uses of quotation in the sense that 
an account of the semantic function of quotation in each of these examples involves an instance of 
the device characteristic of pure quotation.  We follow John Wallace  (1970, 135-136) in holding 
that the semantic rule for pure quotation is given by the reference clause (Q), where ‘ϕ’ takes on 
expressions as values, and we use square brackets as Quinean corner quotes.2 
 
(Q) For any ϕ, [‘ϕ’] refers to ϕ.3 
 
This is a precise expression of Tarski’s informal account of the function of quotation marks.4  
Anyone who understands this rule understands all there is to know about the use of quotation 	
2 An expression consisting of square brackets (treated as corner quotes) around an expression 
containing a metalinguistic variable abbreviates a description of an expression as the concatenation 
of the contained expressions and value of the variable, in the order in which they appear inside the 
brackets.  Thus, [‘f’] = the result of writing ‘‘’ followed by f and then ‘’’.  [ϕ and y] = the result 
of writing ϕ followed by ‘and’ and then y.  And so on.  An expression consisting of square brackets 
around an expression without a contained metalinguistic variable denotes that expression.  Thus,  
[Quine] =  the result of writing ‘Quine’.  And, [ϕ] = the result of writing ϕ. 
3 We suppress explicit relativization of semantic predicates to a language except where it is needed.  
4 Tarski writes, “We denote by this term [‘quotation-mark names’] every name of a sentence (or 
of any other, even meaningless, expression) which consists of quotation marks, left- and right-
hand, and the expression which lies between them, and which (expression) is the object denoted 
by the name in question” (1983, p. 156).  The rule is expressed here.  He later writes, “Quotation-
marks names may be treated like single words of a language, and thus like syntactically simple 
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marks in pure quotation.  In the following,  we sketch an account of the semantic roles of the 
varieties of quotation in (2)-(5), which shows that the device involved in pure quotation plays a 
central role in each.  This will not quite be to say that quotation marks mean the same thing in each 
of these uses, but rather that, as we will suggest, quotation marks are polysemous, and the thread 
that runs through the various uses of quotation marks is captured in a generalization of (Q) we 
introduce below.   
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 takes up pure quotation.  We review 
desiderata on an adequate account, and five proposals that have been made about how to 
understand pure quotation.  We argue for the disquotational theory, as it has come to be called, 
which invokes a simple rule like that expressed in (Q).  We head off some misunderstandings, 
respond to some objections, and draw out some consequences.  Section 3 takes up the use of 
quotation marks in direct discourse.  In section 3.1, we first identify a number of contexts in which 
expressions are referred to but also intended to be understood, where being understood is essential 
for sentences in which they are contained to fulfill their function in communication, though their 
extensional properties do not contribute to fixing the truth conditions of the sentences in which 
they are contained.   We call this a quasi-use-mention.  We argue that it extends to the use of 
quotation marks following ‘means’ in (2), and then, in section 3.2, to certain uses of quotation 
marks with direct discourse as well, though this is not a feature that is represented in a 
compositional account of the truth conditions of the sentences.  We distinguish between strict and 
non-strict forms of direct discourse, the former of which requires mentioning the specific words 
used by the person to whom the discourse is attributed (the subject) and the latter of which allows 
the use of expressions that translate the words the subject used.  We provide truth conditions for 
both strict and non-strict direct discourse.  Non-strict direct discourse also involves quasi-use-
mention though this is not represented in the truth conditions.  In section 3.3, the account is 
extended to direct attitude attributions as illustrated by (3h-i).   Section 4 takes up quotation in 
exposition as illustrated in (4a-c) where what is said is said by the speaker or writer, though some 
of the words, in quotation marks, are to be attributed to another.  Section 5, takes up mixed indirect 
discourse in section 5.1 and mixed attitude attribution in section 5.2. A general account is provided 
for any number of distinct uses of quotation marks in complements of indirect discourse or attitude 
attributions.  Here too we distinguish between a strict and a non-strict reading.  Section 6 takes up 
the question how to accommodate mixed indirect discourse in which expressions in quotation 
marks appear to be intended to be evaluated in a context other than that of the speaker.  This would 
make ‘x said that’ what Kaplan called a ‘monstrous operator’, one which shifts the context of 
evaluation of context sensitive expressions from the speaker’s context to another context.  Without 	
expressions” (p. 159).  It is this last remark in particular that has led to the ascription of the proper 
name theory of quotation to Tarski, though it is noteworthy that he says that they “may be treated” 
that way, not that they are syntactically simple.  The important point for his purposes is that 
quotation terms function like names in the language in the sense of not having semantic 
compositional structure.  See Gómez-Torrente (2001) and in this volume. 
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trying to settle whether the examples that motivate this are well-formed, we show that there is 
nothing problematic about giving truth conditions for them.  A language could make provision for 
this.  Section 7 takes up a prima facie objection to the account that rests on the fact that when we 
translate, e.g., dialogue in a novel, we do not preserve reference to the expressions in the original 
language.  The answer is that ordinary translation preserves function over reference when there is 
a conflict.  Section 8 is a brief summary and conclusion.  
 
2 Pure Quotation 
By pure quotation we have in mind a device in written language for referring to expressions.5  
Expressions are strings or configurations of symbols, including the limiting case of one.  We use 
‘expression’ and ‘symbol’ in the sense in which they are used in logic.6  We can speak of complex 
symbols, so ‘symbol’ and ‘expression’ can be used interchangeably, but we will often use ‘symbol’ 
when we focus on a smallest unit in a symbol system.  Expressions are types, and they are realized 	
5 There is nothing that prevents a similar device from being used in spoken or signed language, or 
any other medium of communication.  For example, the device in the artificial language Lojban 
(see below) makes provision for spoken quotation, and in spoken languages, people will, 
transferring the device designed for writing to speech, say “quote”, utter some word or phrase, and 
then “unquote,” or use so-called finger quotes.  But the device is especially well suited to the 
written word and it is with the written word that it originated.  Marks for indicating text trace their 
lineage back to the second century B.C. in the diple, an arrow-like mark ‘>’, used as a proofreading 
device at the Library of Alexandria by the editor and librarian Aristarchus.  But quotation marks 
in the form widely used today attained their modern form and function only in the last half of the 
18th century, driven by experimentation with methods for setting off dialogue in novels (Houston 
2013, pp. 187-210).  There are other uses (or abuses) of quotation marks, such as scare (or shudder) 
quotes to indicate that the word in quotation marks is being used in a non-standard sense or in a 
sense that the writer herself would not use the word or words to express (e.g., the Onion headline 
‘Jacques Derrida “dies”’), and quotation marks used to identify a word being defined in a 
contextual definition, a purpose for which italics are also used (e.g., ‘A boondoggle/“boondoggle” 
is a braided cord worn by Boy Scouts as a neckerchief slide, hatband, or ornament’).   Another use 
is the so-called emphatic use of quotation marks for emphasis in ads and signs in the way that 
italics often are, as in, for example: ‘“Fresh” Seafood’, and ‘Lane may be “slippery” due to oiling’.  
In these uses, while the quotation marks are used to draw attention to a word, the word itself in 
quotation marks is not an object about which the sentences says anything, and is not used in 
determining whether it is true or false. The quotation marks function a bit like meta-remarks about 
the primary work that the sentence is doing but without being incorporated into its content or being 
the content of a distinct meta-level speech act.  In this respect, it is like the conventional implicature 
of using ‘but’ in the place of ‘and’ to suggest a contrast between what is expressed before and after 
‘but’ (see Predelli 2003 on this in connection with scare quotes).  We therefore set these uses of 
quotation marks aside. 
6 While it is an interesting question what the analysis of the concept of a symbol or expression is 
in the sense in which it is used in logic, this is not a task we take up on this paper, any more than 
we take up the analysis of the concept of a language, or a word, or a sentence.  Our focus is on 
devices for referring to expressions, not the analysis of what they refer to.  
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in tokens, typically spoken, signed, or written.  Expressions are not intrinsically meaningful, and 
need not appear in any actual language.  For example, ‘f&r©n#th§’ is an expression but does not 
have a meaning or appear in any natural language.  As we are interested in quotation in written 
language, we focus on written expressions, that is, inscription types and their tokens.  Inscription 
types are determinants of expression types.  The letters, words, phrases, and sentences in this paper 
(tokens of which you are reading) are examples.   
A characteristic feature of quotation, as we are interested in it, is that it involves the 
construction of a term for an expression by incorporating the expression itself.  A standard form 
for quotation involves flanking an expression with other expressions, which we call quotation 
marks.  Using ‘…’ as a placeholder for an expression, examples are:  
 
 ‘…’  or “…”  English 
„…”    Dutch, Romanian, Polish 
„…“ or ‚…‘   Lithuanian, Macedonian, Icelandic 
«…» or ‹…›  French, German, Russian  
›…‹ or »…«  Hungarian, Polish, Danish 
『…』or「…」 Chinese, Japanese, Korean 
lu … li'u  Lojban (an artificial language)7 
 
We will call expressions of these forms quotations or quotation terms.  We will use single and 
double quotation marks for illustration.  When we intend pure quotation henceforth we will use 
single quotation marks.  We will use double quotation marks for other forms of quotation.  The 
treatment extends straightforwardly to other styles of quotation marks, like those listed, as well as 
to using a special font, for example, italics, or underlining/overlining. 
In the following,  we will use ‘QUOT(f)’ to mean the result of performing an appropriate 
syntactic operation on f so as to yield a quotation term incorporating f (where as above ‘f’ is a 
metalinguistic variable that takes expressions as values).  In pure quotation, quotation marks flank 
an expression, and the quotation term so formed refers to the expression enclosed in quotation 
marks.  Call the position of f in an expression QUOT(f) a quotation context.  Thus, we say an 
expression occurs in an quotation context iff it occupies the position of f in an expression of the 
form QUOT(f).  For the purposes of this section, let this be understood as a pure quotation context.   
There are a number of observations that theories of pure quotation should accommodate:  
 
1. Quotation contexts are opaque, that is, (a) you cannot in general intersubstitute coreferring 
or coextensive terms in quotation contexts salva veritate, (b) you cannot existentially 	
7 Lojban’s quotation marks can be used in speech or in writing indifferently.  In distinction from 
natural languages, grammatical instances are restricted to containing expressions in a recursively 
specified syntax for Lojban. 
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generalize, and (c) you cannot bind argument positions in f when it appears in a quotation 
context from outside that context.    
2. Quotation can be used to introduce new symbols or expressions and to refer to expressions 
that are not in the language one is using, without introducing those expressions 
independently of the quotation term. 
3. In pure quotation, QUOT(f) refers (non-accidentally) to the expression in its quotation 
context.  
4. In understanding quotation devices, e.g., quotation marks, (a) one understands how to 
generate and understand a potential infinity of new expressions, and (b) one has the 
capacity to understand novel quotation terms, in the sense of being able to determine what 
they refer to, on the basis of recognition of the quotation term itself.8   
 
Another condition sometimes placed on a theory quotation is that it make sense of the possibility 
that words can be used and mentioned simultaneously.  This is not, however, a feature of pure 
quotation.  We return to the case of dual use and mention in quotation below. 
According to a standard taxonomy, the five main theories of pure quotation are the name 
theory, the description theory, the demonstrative theory, the identity (or use) theory, and the 
disquotation theory.9  We endorse what has been called the disquotation theory, if not everything 
that has been said about it.  The disquotation theory is easy to state.  It asserts that we grasp 
everything that we need to know about how pure quotation devices function in grasping the 
following rule (GQ) (generalizing (Q)): 
 
(GQ) For any expression f, QUOT(f) refers to f. 
 
This handles all of the desiderata above.  (GQ) obviously explains why QUOT(f) refers non-
accidentally to the expression in the quotation context, #3.  The fact that intersubstituting in 
quotation contexts leads to a change of reference explains why one can’t intersubstitute co-
referring terms salva veritate, #1a.  The fact that the contained expression is not functioning 
semantically explains why you can’t existentially generalize or bind argument places, #1b-c. 10  
	
8 This is related to Quine’s remark that “a quotation is not a description but a hieroglyph; it 
designates its object not by describing it in terms of other objects, but by picturing it” (Quine 1940, 
p. 26).  While we aim to capture what seems right about this thought, that a quotation term contains 
the type to which it refers, we do not treat quotation as literally picturing what it designates.  The 
device is actually simpler than that suggests. 
9 A useful overview of the literature can be found in (Saka 2013).  We don’t review every theory 
in the following. 
10 In connection with this, it is worth noting that, contra Saka (2013, p. 941), our view is not that 
quotation marks represent a function that takes an argument and yields a value.  As just noted, the 
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The fact that the rule quantifies over all expressions explains why it can be used to introduce new 
expressions and refer to expressions in other languages (#2).  It clearly explains how grasp of the 
rule is sufficient to generate and understand a potential infinity of new expressions and to 
determine their referents on the basis of recognition of the quotation term itself, #4.  
Before we explain this further and consider objections, we briefly review the alternatives.  
The proper name theory, which has been attributed to Quine (1940, p. 26) and Tarski (1983, 
p. 159; though see note 4 above), is nowadays largely rejected, but it is instructive, and helps bring 
out what is distinctive about quotation.  It holds that quotations are like ordinary proper names, 
such as ‘Julius Caesar’ or ‘Mohandas Gandhi’.  The proper name theory explains desideratum #1 
because the contained term is treated as part of a name’s spelling, like ‘bill’ in ‘billabong’.  
However, it fails to accommodate desiderata #2-#4: it does not explain why QUOT(f) refers to f 
except as an accident of spelling, #3.  For this reason, it cannot explain its function in introducing 
new expressions (#2), since to figure out that the name refers to a new expression it must be 
introduced independently.  And for the same reason it cannot explain how understanding quotation 
puts one in a position to understand new quotation terms without having their referents introduced 
independently, #4.   
The description theory (Geach 1957, p. 82; Quine 1960, p. 143, p. 212) retains an element 
of the proper name theory, holding that there are primitive quotation names of either words or 
letters and that strings of words or letters in quotation marks are descriptions of their concatenation 
in the order in which they appear.  For example, ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ is interpreted either 
as the concatenation of ‘Caesar’ with ‘crossed’ … or the concatenation of ‘C’ with ‘a’ with ‘e’ ….  
But since this retains the proper name theory at its core, it inherits its defects.   
Davidson’s paratactic or demonstrative theory of quotation (Davidson 1979) treats 
quotation marks semantically as a description containing a demonstrative. Thus the quotation 
marks in a quotation are taken to be semantically equivalent to a description, ‘The expression of 
which this is a token’.  This handles desiderata #1 (since the expression is a sample to be 
demonstrated and not syntactically a part of the sentence) and #2 (since anything can be the referent 
of a demonstrative) but not #3 or #4b, since nothing constrains the referent to be the contained 
expression.  Another difficulty is that it is hard to see how to extend this to using italics or 
underlining for the same purpose, since there is nothing separate from the token expression itself 
to serve as the sample to be demonstrated (Reimar 1996b, p. 135).   
A feature that makes for trouble on this account is the use of the free-wheeling 
demonstrative ‘this’, and some difficulties could be removed by constraining it to refer to the 
expression token in the quotation marks.  But how do we do this?  Do we say: the expression type 
of which a token is contained within these tokens of quotation marks?  But now we have a 
demonstrative reference to token quotations marks and similar difficulties can arise.  What is 	
position inside quotation marks is not an argument position.  It does not take referring terms.  It 
cannot be bound.  And the rule [GQ] does not so represent it.     
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wanted is a rule that uses a description to determine a referent as in (DQ) (demonstrative quotation 
rule). 
 
(DQ) For any expression f, for any utterance act u, if u is an utterance of [‘f’], u refers to the 
expression type of which the use of f in u is a token. 
 
(Recall we are using ‘[‘ and ‘]’ as the left and right Quinean corner quotes—see note 2.) Once we 
have got it in this form, however, it seems clear that the same effect is achieved with a 
simplification, since by inspection the expression type of which the use of f is a token is just f:  
 
(Q) For any expression f, [‘f’] refers to f. 
 
This just is the disquotational theory, however, applied to single quotation marks.  From this 
perspective, the mistake Davidson made was to treat a rule for determining a referent of an 
expression as if it gave the meaning of the expression.  This is a mistake equivalent to taking ‘I’ 
to mean ‘the speaker who is now using “I”’.  This is clearly a mistake since the proposition 
expressed by ‘I am sitting’ does not entail that there are any speakers, since it can be true in a 
possible world in which I am sitting but neither I nor anyone else is a speaker. 
The identity or use theory of quotation (Johnson 2011; Recanati 2000, 2001; Reimar 1996a; 
Saka 1998; Washington 1992) takes quotation marks (or other similar devices) to have a function 
similar to punctuation (see also Johnson this volume). On this view, their purpose is to indicate 
that the expression in the quotation context is being used to refer to itself.  Thus, it is not the 
quotation term itself, but the contained expression that refers, and the function of the quotation 
marks is, as it were, to disambiguate the use of the expression.  The quotation marks do not 
themselves refer, describe, or demonstrate, and neither does the quotation term.  The main 
motivation for the identity or use theory, as opposed to the disquotational theory, is that it treats 
the use of quotation marks as continuous with verbal reference to expressions made by using them 
as in (6), 
 
(6) Call me Ishmael 
 
where the speaker is understood to be referring to the name ‘Ishmael’ rather than (merely) using 
it.  The identity or use theory treats the speaker as using ‘Ishmael’ to refer to itself.  A secondary 
consideration is that it allows quotation to be used to refer to tokens as well as types, and types of 
various sorts, depending on the speaker’s intentions.  As we will note, the disquotational view can 
accommodate this. 
The disquotational and identity/use theories are quite similar.  There is a sense in which 
the disquotation theory might be said to treat quotation marks as punctuation—they are not given 
semantic significance independently of use around an expression.  The difference lies in what the 
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rule for quotation marks treats as the referring term.  For the identity/use theory the rule goes as in 
(QI) (quotation rule for the identity theory):    
 
(QI)  For any expression f, when f appears in an expression of the form [‘f’], f refers to f.11 
 
This is, on the face of it, a less straightforward way to understand the rule for quotation, and seems 
gratuitous from the standpoint of semantics, since there is no need to treat a substring of the string 
the rule applies to as the genuine referring term.  Moreover, this is clearly not something that is 
transparent to users of quotation terms, and it is difficult to see what about our use of quotation 
terms would motivate taking only the contained string to be the referring term. The motivation to 
preserve continuity with examples like ‘Call me Ishmael’ (even granting in this sentence ‘Ishmael’ 
is used to refer to itself rather than being the deferred ostension of a tacit demonstrative) is not 
adequate.  First, historically, quotation is a device that arose specifically in the context of written 
language (see note 5).  There is no reason to take it to be a device continuous with or derivative 
from any device in spoken language.  Second, in the development of written languages, from the 
design standpoint it makes sense to introduce a syntactic device that functions as characterized by 
(GQ).  In contrast, from the design standpoint, (QI) seems gratuitous and unmotivated.  Moreover, 
we will argue that (GQ) proves to be particularly fruitful in understanding how quotational devices 
extend beyond pure quotation.  
In sum, grasp of the rule (GQ) 
 
(GQ) For any expression f, QUOT(f) refers to f. 
 
suffices for anyone who understands it to understand any sentence in which a quotation name 
appears (used for pure quotation).  Nothing more needs to be added.  But if you do not understand 
this much, you do not understand quotation.  This suffices to explain the connection between the 
contained expression and the term’s referent.  It explains how we get from recognition of the term 
itself to its referent.  It explains how quotation generates an infinite number of expressions and 
puts one in a position to understand them (when they are presented—see below).  It explains how 
it can be used to introduce new symbols and refer to expressions in other languages.  Importantly, 
it captures the sense in which quotation is, in Quine’s terms, like a hieroglyph, but without the 
need to treat it as literally picturing itself. 
	
11 The use theory also seems to give the wrong result for certain sentences.  For example, if the 
use theory is correct, we cannot truly say in English that ‘nurphalisturbia’ is not a word that has a 
use in English, because that would ipso facto illustrate a use of the word in English.  Yet, it seems 
we can say that truly.  The disquotational theory avoids this result.  It is also, perhaps, slightly odd 
to think that every expression (of Chinese, or Russian, or Arabic, or yet unimagined languages) is 
a name of itself in English, which is a consequence of the theory. 
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What about the case of using italics (or underlining/overlining) to indicate that one is 
referring to the italicized (or underlined/overlined) word?  (GQ) applies to this as well.  
Underlining and overlining are devices like quotation marks in the sense that they involve a symbol 
external to the expression being referred to.  But in the case of italicizing a word, the italicized 
word is a determinate of the type that the italicized expression refers to.  In this case, the word, 
though italicized, is used to refer to a type of which it is a token, though not to the more determinate 
type the italicized word represents. 
Sometimes the disquotational theory is said to treat quotation marks as a functor that takes 
an expression as an argument and returns the expression as a value.  This is a mistake.  The rule 
(GQ) tells you what the quotation term refers to on the basis of how it is constructed.  It carries no 
more commitments than that. To treat it as assigning a function to quotation marks is to assimilate 
it to expressions that have a different semantic role.  The position of ‘f’ in [‘f’] is not an argument 
position at all because it does not treat the expression that appears there as a referring term.  (GQ) 
gives a minimalist but sufficient account of the function of pure quotation.  No assimilation to 
other devices is needed: it is what it is and not another thing.  Most of the mistakes in the theory 
of quotation derive from trying to understand quotation in terms of other devices of reference.   
A straightforward and interesting consequence of (GQ) is that a language that contains a 
quotation device that obeys (GQ) does not have a recursively definable syntax because it contains 
a nondenumerably infinite number of semantically primitive expressions. 12  Call the basic 
vocabulary of a language minus quotation terms (if any) its basic lexicon.  The basic lexicon of 
any natural language is finite.13  Each item in the basic lexicon must be learned independently of 
the others.  The rest of the language, excluding again quotation names, can be understood on the 
basis of understanding the basic lexicon and rules for their combination.  (GQ) introduces an 
additional class of expressions that refer to expressions.  It does not generate them from the basic 
lexicon together with a set of rules for combining expressions.14  Instead, it quantifies over all 
expressions, including expressions that are not in the language, to produce expressions in the 
language which are about those expressions.  (This is another way to see why quotation cannot be 
assimilated to functional expressions, which can take as argument terms only terms that refer in 	
12 It is also said to be a counterexample to compositionality because while putting quotation marks 
around an expression to form a term referring to it is a syntactic rule, its “semantic value” isn’t 
composed from the semantic values of its constituents.  Some take this to be a reason to reject the 
disquotational account, but since it is perfectly intelligible it is rather this particular form of 
compositionality, or its application to quotation, that should be rejected.  See Pagin and 
Westerstahl (2010) for discussion. 
13 What about numerals?  Aren’t there an infinite number of them — even non-denumerably many, 
since there is no reason in principle not to allow full decimal representations of real numbers?  But 
the basic numerals are ‘0’ through ‘9’, and the referents of complex numerals and decimal 
expressions are given in relation to the primitive numerals. 
14 As remarked in note 7, the artificial language Lojban is an exception, for it restricts quotation to 
expressions otherwise in the language. 
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the language.)  Since the class of expressions is not recursively enumerable, the class of quotation 
names is not recursively enumerable either.   
In addition, nothing one grasps in grasping the basic lexicon and the rule for quotation puts 
one in a position to understand every expression in the language, specifically the class of quotation 
names.  It might be thought that this runs afoul of Davidson’s learnability argument, the upshot of 
which was supposed to be that grasp of a finite vocabulary of primitive items had to suffice for 
understanding any potential utterance in a natural language on pain of making it unlearnable for 
finite beings like us (Davidson 2001, pp. 8-9).  Quotation names turn out to show a limitation in 
the argument.  For, although we are not in advance in a position to understand every expression in 
the language, specifically all of the quotation terms, given the way quotation works, as soon as we 
are presented with a quotation term, we can use the rule to determine what it refers to, for in 
recognizing the quotation term itself, we are in a position then to see what it refers to.  
It has been objected that because the disquotational theory quantifies over expressions, it 
may undergenerate quotation terms (Lepore 1999).  The thought is that any symbol can appear in 
quotation marks, whether or not this symbol is an expression in any actual spoken language, or 
even in any possible language.  As noted above, however, we do not distinguish between symbols 
and expressions.  In addition, any symbol can be used in some language, even if it is not used in 
any actual language.  Apart from this, the objection is self-defeating because in offering it the 
objector must use a term to capture the class of things that he thinks the quotation device can be 
applied to which is larger than the class of expressions.  This supplies the proponent of the 
disquotational theory with a term to use in place of ‘expression’ that will capture the right category 
of items (supposing the objector is correct).  
Finally, one of the themes of the identity/use theory of quotation is that quotation terms 
can be used to refer to different sorts of things, not just expression types.  If we think about how 
the identity/use theorist has to characterize his own rule to accommodate this, however, we can 
see that whatever he can say can be adopted by the disquotational theory.  There are two basic 
ways to do it.  First, one can argue that quotation marks are ambiguous, and the different uses 
signal different sorts of things as the referents.  Disambiguating would amount to supplying for 
each different use a different target.  For example, we might introduce a use of quotation marks to 
refer to tokens of types that appear in the quotation marks.  Suppose that we use asterisks as 
quotation marks that are used to refer to the token of the expression that appears between them.  
We can give the following clause: 
 
(Q*) For any expression f, for any speaker u, time t, [*f*] as used by u at t refers to the token 
of f produced by u at t in producing a token of [*f*] 
 
For expression types individuated according to different standards, we can replace the restriction 
on f in the first quantifier with a term that expresses the appropriate notion.  Second, one could 
treat quotation marks as context sensitive, with the kind of thing referred to being determined 
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relative to the speaker’s intention.  We still need to have in mind a class of items over which we 
can quantify and in relation to which we can locate other types.  So we still need to use ‘expression’ 
in some suitable sense in the restriction on our quantifier.  But this is fine as long as whatever else 
the speaker has in mind can be located in relation to it.  So, for example, we can give the rule 
(QCS) (quotation as context sensitive): 
 
(QCS)  For any expression f, for any speaker u, time t, QUOT(f) as used by u at t refers to the 
type or token that bears the relation intended by u at t to the token of f produced by u at t. 
 
Having said this, we add that we think pure quotation is conventionally used to refer to expression 
types, and we assume this in the following.15   
It is sometime said that the disquotational theory, while suitable for pure quotation, can’t 
be the correct theory of quotation because it cannot handle cases beyond (1) and possibly simple 
cases of direct quotation as in (2a).  In our view, this desideratum is confused.  Quotation, as we 
said in the introduction, is polysemous.  It has a variety of related uses.  The conceptual core of 
quotation, however, is captured in the disquotation rule, (GQ), for pure quotation.  To try to give 
one rule for all the forms of quotation, as opposed to explaining them in relation to the core use, 
would be like trying to give a single definition for ‘walk’ that accommodated all the following 
uses: ‘I went for a walk’, ‘I walked the dog’, ‘We’ll have to walk the wardrobe to the bedroom 
rather than carry it’, ‘She walks the ramparts’, ‘The workers threatened to walk’.  Only confusion 
can result.  In the following, we explain the uses found in (2)-(4) as exploiting the device of pure 
quotation for further purposes.  
3 Quotation in which Contained Expressions Are Intended to Be Understood 
In this section we discuss the varieties of quotation found in examples (2)-(3).  We begin with the 
idea that in using a quotation term, it can be crucial to its function that it contains a meaningful 
expression which is both understood and understood to be referred to, though the meanings of the 




We begin with (2), repeated here,  
 
(2) “psychology” literally means “the study of the soul.”16 	
15 Can’t one write on the black board: ‘This’ is written in chalk.  Well, we get the idea, of course, 
but it helps that ‘this’ is the word written!  Consider: ‘Boston’ is written in chalk.  Puzzling!  We 
feel like saying: sometimes yes, sometimes no.  But then this is about the word being written in 
chalk (a chalk token produced) on this or that occasion. 
16  American printer’s conventions place commas and periods that are part of the containing 




It will be useful in considering the function of quotation in (2) to first consider the use of the 
following sentences: 
 
(7) ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ in German means that snow is white 
(8) ‘Schnee’ in German means the same as ‘neige’ in French. 
(9) ‘Schnee’ in German means snow 
(10) ‘Schnee’ in German means snow 
 
In (7) the subject term is simply used to refer to a German sentence, and it is not presupposed that 
we know its meaning because the point of (7) is to explain it. But how does (7) do this?  The 
traditional answer is that the complement, ‘that snow is white’, refers to the proposition that the 
German sentence expresses, and by grasping that proposition and associating it with the German 
sentence, we come to know what it means.  However, how do we grasp the proposition?  Merely 
referring to the proposition isn’t sufficient, for if we had named the proposition that snow is white 
‘Betty’ and substituted that for the complement, when we told someone what ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ 
meant, she would be none the wiser.  A Fregean might say that there is a mode of presentation 
attached to ‘that snow is white’ that suffices for one to grasp what it refers to, but this is 
mysterious—what mode of presentation ipso facto suffices for entertaining its object if it is a 
proposition?  And how would this explain the importance of the appearance of the sentence itself 
in the complement rather than a name?   
There is a simpler answer to the question how (7) informs us of what the ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ 
means in German, namely, that (i) it is a condition on the truth of (7) that the sentence in the 
complement translate ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ and (ii) we understand that sentence.  Once we see this, 
we can also see that what the complement refers to, if anything, is irrelevant to the work that the 
sentence does for us.  It might as well be the sentence itself rather than a proposition, for all the 
use that the proposition is to us (Ludwig 2014).  So here we have a device for conveying the 
meaning of a sentence that involves using a sentence in our language, where it is crucial for the 
work that is to be done that our interlocutor understand the sentence, even though the extensional 
properties of the sentence do not contribute in any way to determining the truth conditions of the 
containing sentence.   
Now consider in contrast (8), where we take the quotation terms to be pure quotation.  In 
this case, it is clear that one could understand the sentence without understanding either of the 
quoted expressions and so remain in the dark about the meaning of either term.  This stands in 
contrast to (9) and (10) which we use to explain what a term in German means to someone who 
speaks English.  The difference is simply that we presuppose that our audience understands the 	
A simple syntactic rewrite of the sentences yields the form that serves as input to the rules given 
in the following.  
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complement expressions (and so assume that the audience doesn’t fully understand the sentence 
without doing so) and that the sentences are true only if the term appearing to the right of the verb 
means the same as the term mentioned on the left.  In (8) we relativize the meaning relation to both 
German and French.  In (9) and (10) we relativize only the term mentioned on the left because in 
using the terms on the right in English we fix their interpretations.  In (9) we use italics to indicate 
that the expression to the right of ‘means’ is being used to give the meaning of the expression on 
the left, that is, that it is both to be understood and to be understood as the same in meaning as the 
expression on the left.  In (10) the same information is carried simply by context. 
With this in mind, when we consider (2), we can see that while pure quotation is being 
used on the left, the expression quoted on the right is intended to be understood, for this is a 
sentence we use to convey the meaning of one expression by using another.  This use of quotation 
involves reference to the contained expression, and that reference is secured by (GQ), but there is 
another dimension to the use which, like the function of the complement in (7), does not come out 
in thinking about the contribution of the expression to the truth conditions of the sentence.  We 
call this a quasi-use of the expression, by which we mean that it is essential to its function in the 
context that it be understood as used by the speaker (this, e.g., secures disambiguation and fixes 
the contributions to meaning by context sensitive terms), but the extensional properties of the 
expression contained do not contribute to fixing the truth conditions of the sentence.  We will call 
quotation of the sort illustrated on the right side of ‘means’ in (2) quasi-use quotation. 
 
3.2 Direct Discourse 
With this in hand we turn to the use of quotation with direct discourse.  A common view about 
direct discourse is that the function of a sentence such as (3a) 
 
(3) (a) He said, “Get serious, boy.” 
 
is to give a literal rendering of the words spoken by someone on a particular occasion.  However, 
the practice is more complicated than this.  In particular, we will distinguish between strict and 
non-strict direct discourse.  In strict direct discourse, the sentence of direct discourse is true iff its 
subject bears the relation expressed by the verb to the sentence in quotation marks (excluding 
punctuation introduced solely as a result of printer’s conventions).   
 The strict use is illustrated in (3b-d). 
 
(3) (b) She said, “Gorse is common in Scotland”; she did not say, “Furze is common in 
Scotland.” 
 (c) Caesar literally said, “Veni, Vidi, Vici,” not “I came, I saw, I conquered.” 




Here what is important are the words themselves rather than any translation of them.  ‘Gorse’ and 
‘Furze’ mean the same, but switching ‘Gorse’ and ‘Furze’ in (3b) may change a truth into a 
falsehood.  Similarly, in (3c), ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’ is a translation of ‘Veni, Vidi, Vici’, 
but a contrast is being drawn.  In (3d) clearly the meaning of the words can’t be at issue because 
it is a nonsense sentence.  For strict direct discourse, we can give the truth conditions as in (DQS) 
(direct quotation strict), where ‘ref(a, u, t)’ expresses a reference function from a name, speaker 
and time to a referent of the name as used by the speaker at that time, that is,  
 
 For any x, u, t, ref(a, u, t) = x iff a as used by u at t refers to x, 
 
and we relativize the truth predicate to the speaker and time as well. 
 
(DQS) For any speaker u, time t, expression ϕ, name a, [a said, “ϕ”] is true(u, t)  
iff  
there is a time t' < t such that ref(a, u, t) says ϕ at t' 
 
But not all uses are strict.  First, very often understanding the expression quoted is essential to the 
function of the sentence, as in dialogue in a novel.  This is the case for (3a).  Thus, it must be 
construed as involving a quasi-use of the contained expressions.  This does not show up in the 
specification of the truth conditions, but is an aspect of the conventions associated with the use of 
direct discourse in certain uses.  Ideally these would be marked with a special sort of quotation 
mark, but in practice context disambiguates.  
Second, in direct discourse we also often use words in our language to report what someone 
said in another language as in (3e). 
 
(3) (e) Then Jesus said to them, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the 
things that are God's.” 
 
In this case, we use a translation of the words of Jesus (as reported in Mark) into our language, but 
they are not the words that Jesus used.  And despite the contrast with (3c) above, there is nothing 
problematic about this use.  Thus, in the non-strict use of direct quotation, we intend a quasi-use 
and that the subject have uttered the sentence referred to or a sentence that translates it.  The first 
of these requirements, as mentioned, does not show up in the truth conditions.  The second is 
accommodated in (DQNS) (direct quotation non-strict), in which introduce the standard event 
analysis of action sentences which treats the action verb as introducing an existential event 
quantifier (Ludwig 2010).  For this purpose, we use the following abbreviation:  
 




ref(a, u, t) is an agent of e at t' and e is an utterance and e is an instance of s.   
 
We also make explicit relativization of the semantic predicates to languages.  We introduce this 
additional complexity because we need to relativize the translation of ϕ to the language the subject 
used in his utterance of s, and there may be no unique language he speaks in which s is a sentence.  
The truth conditions are then given in (DQNS). 
 
(DQNS) For any speaker u, time t, expression ϕ, name a, [a said, “ϕ”] is true(u, t, English)  
 iff  
 there is an event e, a time t' < t, and a sentence s, such that  
(i) says(e, ref(a, u, t), t', s) and  
(ii) ϕ in English translates s in the language of ref( , u, t) at t' in e.17 
 
(DQNS) accommodates the case in which the subject uses the same sentence as the speaker, since 
every sentence is a translation of itself.  
There is a further complication presented by the practice of using punctuation and ellipses 
in direct quotation (of oral speech) as in (3f). 
 
(3) (f) “Good morning! it was kind of you to push the chair up that hill ... I hope it wasn't heavy 
for you,” said Connie, looking back at the keeper outside the door. 
 
The exclamation mark indicates something about the mode of delivery.  While in pure quotation 
[‘f!’] refers to an expression that has an exclamation mark at the end, in direct quotation, reporting 
oral speech, the exclamation mark indicates a non-symbolic feature of the utterance act type.  But 
this does not need special treatment because the type picked out by [‘f!’] has one realization in 
written language and another in spoken language. The same extends to question marks, italics, 
boldface, caps, and other devices such as repeating a letter to indicate dragging out a syllable, as 
in, ‘That was soooo boring’.  These indicate aspects of the utterance type that extend beyond what 
words were used to include how they were used.   
Ellipsis comes in two varieties.18   
(I) It can be used to indicate that words in the original are omitted.  This is illustrated in 
(3g).   	
17 It might be objected that ‘x said …’ doesn’t contain a reference to English in its analysis.  Then 
replace ‘English’ with ‘the language of u at t in uttering [a said, “ϕ”]’.   
18 Of course, an ellipsis mark may be a part of an expression referred to in quotation marks.  One 
can say, for example, when he wrote, “Well … I wouldn’t go so far as to say it is entirely 




(g) Davidson said, “Quotation is a device used to refer to typographical … shapes by 
exhibiting samples.”   
 
We call this omission ellipsis.  Omission ellipsis can be accommodated by conditionalizing on 
whether or not this sort of ellipsis occurs in a quotation in direct discourse and requiring that the 
subject (Davidson in the case of (1g)) have uttered a sentence or a translation of a sentence obtained 
from the sentence with the ellipsis by inclusion of some additional material in the position of the 
ellipsis.  We will not write out the clauses. 
(II) But in (3f) that is not their function.  The ellipsis indicates neither that something is 
omitted nor that the subject uttered or wrote anything that corresponds to the ellipsis ‘…’, but just 
that there was a temporal gap (a hesitation) between utterance corresponding to the material before 
the ellipsis in the quotation and the material after it, though it is intended as a single speech act.  
For the case of ellipsis of the sort illustrated in (3f), one might initially think that we could 
treat  
 
x said “---- … ----” 
 
as roughly equivalent to  
 
 x said “----” followed by a pause and then “----” 
 
This could be incorporated straightforwardly into a truth conditional account.  But an ellipsis can 
occur anywhere, including multiple times in a single sentence such as: He said, “I think … you 
really don’t want to … tease the sasquatch.”  To report this as his saying “I think” followed by a 
pause, then “you really don’t want to” followed by a pause, then “tease the sasquatch,” is 
compatible with his not having said, “I think you really don’t want to tease the sasquatch.”  It is 
more straightforward to treat ellipsis in this use—like an exclamation mark, or italics, or a question 
mark—as indicating something about the utterance type beyond what words in what order are 
included in it, namely, that it includes somewhat greater than usual temporal gaps between portions 
of what is uttered. 
Importantly, for all these ways of indicating something about the utterance type, we have 
to take translation, as it figures in (DQNS), to require preservation of devices indicating something 
about the type of utterance beyond its content. 
Dialogue in fiction or in reports where the context determines who is speaking (typically 




3.3 Direct Attitude Attributions 
A striking use of quotation is in direct attributions of thought.  These may also include ellipses and 
punctuation like exclamation marks and question marks inside quotation marks.  In these cases, 
we treat the sentences as if they expressed a thought someone is having or had or will have.  We 
will treat the sentences understood relative to the thinker and time of thought as expressing the 
contents of occurrent thoughts of the thinker (the subject of the sentence).  As in (3h), the sentence 
that is used to capture the content of a thought may be split between two quotations.  First we join 
the quotations into one, as in (3h.i).  
 
(3h) (i) Alice thought, “And what is the use of a book without pictures or conversation?” 
 
This can be thought of as a purely syntactic operation performed before interpretation.  Then we 
give the truth conditions for ‘a thought, “ϕ”’ in (DQT) (direct quotation thought). 
 
(DQT) For any speaker u, time t, expression ϕ, [a thought, “ϕ”] is true(u, t)  
iff  
there is a time t' < t, and a state s, such that  
(i) thinks(s, ref(a), t') and  
(ii) @(s, ϕ, ref(a), t')) 
 
The variable ‘s’ takes states as values.  The relational predicate ‘@(s, ϕ, x, t)’ expresses a sameness-
of-content relation between f (in English) interpreted relative to x at t (that is, with x and t as values 
for the contextual parameters), on the one hand, and x’s thought s, on the other.  We wish this to 
be interpreted broadly so that it subsumes both sameness of propositional content where 
appropriate but also inner exclamations, thanks, pauses, and so on, since we wish to accommodate 
examples such as (11) and (12). 
 
(11) “Thank goodness!” he thought to himself. 
(12) “Well done,” he thought as he smiled. 
 
In this connection, the use of the exclamation point can be taken to reflect an aspect of the state 
associated with what we might call the reception of its content—it marks the thought as emphatic, 
as we might put it.  A question mark indicates that the psychological mode is “interrogative”—
that is, ‘“Which one is it?” he thought’ means the same as ‘“Which one is it?” he wondered’.  An 
ellipsis indicates a pause (or hesitation) in a thought.  One way of thinking about it is to think of 
the relation introduced as aiming to capture something about the way that the thinker him or herself 
would express the thought at the time in her language—that if she verbally expressed the thought 
at the time of thinking it, in a play-by-play report, as it were, what she said could be reported in 
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direct discourse using the sentence used to characterize it.  This would mean that such attributions 
would be limited to linguistic beings, but on reflection this seems plausible, because it is quite 
difficult to make sense of attributing a thought to a nonlinguistic animal using (3h) or (11) or (12), 
except under the pretense that it speaks a language or thinks in a language.  
An alternative would be to think of these attributions as requiring that the subject (thinker) 
explicitly be thinking in words, in the way that we sometimes have a particular sentence in mind 
or a particular sentence occurs to us which we do not utter (‘What a nincompoop!’).  However, 
since we may also want to attribute something like (14) to someone without supposing that he has 
in mind, in this way, the words for expressing the thought, but merely that if he did express it, 
using those words to report what he said would be apt, this cannot cover all cases.  But there may 
be a use which aims precisely to get at having a particular “thought sentence” in mind.  To capture 
this, we can substitute for ‘thinks’ a relation that expresses being in a state of verbally thinking a 
thought at a time, and change the equivalence relation to require the state to be not just like in 
content but to be like in respect of involving a thought sentence that is the same as (on the strict 
reading) or a translation of (on the non-strict reading) the sentence in quotation marks. 
One difference between direct discourse and direct attribution of thoughts is worth drawing 
attention to.  In direct discourse, we relate a sentence ϕ used by the person uttering it to a sentence 
s uttered by its subject, requiring that the one be the same as or translation the other, where this 
just requires a translation manual, not that the sentences be interpreted relative to context (they 
may contain nonsense terms even).  In direct thought attributions we interpret the complement 
sentence relative to the thinker and time of the thought because we are interested in sameness of 
propositional content between a sentence and a state.  This ensures that indexical elements like the 
‘I’, in the complement of (3i), and demonstratives and tense are correctly interpreted for the 
purpose of conveying the content and mode of the thought. 
 
(3) (i) “If I had a child!” she thought to herself; “if I had him inside me as a child!” 
 
This can be extended to inner dialogues in fiction and reporting where the context determines who 
the thinker is (that is, free direct thought attributions) by treating them as translatable into 
(shorthand for) direct attributions.  
 
4 Quotation in Exposition 
The examples in (4) involve exposition in which an author is expressing something in his own 
voice, but in part using the words of another, as in (4a-b), or a translation of the words of another, 
as in (4c).  
 
(4) (a) In this chapter, Mill attempts to delineate when the authority of society can rightly limit 
individuality and the "sovereignty of the individual over himself." 
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(b) Berkeley’s objective in the New Theory of Vision was “to shew the manner wherein we 
perceive by sight the distance, magnitude, and situation of objects. Also to consider the 
difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and touch, and whether there be any idea 
common to both senses” (NTV §1). 
(c) They substituted, as Kant has pointed out, “a physiology of the human understanding” 
for the Critical investigation of the claims of reason, and anthropology for ethics.19  
 
We wish first to say that the speaker (of any of (4a-c)) asserts what is expressed by the sentence 
stripped of a first layer of quotation marks.  Then we wish to say that the words in quotation marks 
in the sentence or a translation of them were used by another, whom we will call ‘the subject’, as 
indicated in the sentence, or by a citation, or the context.  We will not require that the subject have 
uttered a sentence that expresses the same thing as what the speaker utters, however.  For one may 
say, in one’s own voice, e.g.,  
 
I reject, in distinction from Kant, the mere “empirical reality of time” and accept its 
“absolute and transcendental reality.” 
 
In addition, one may use words or phrases in a single sentence drawn from different sentences and 
even different texts.  We will call this variety of quotation ‘scholarly quotation’ and the quotation 
marks in this use ‘scholar quotes’. 
A question arises about whether we should put into the truth conditions of sentences like 
(4a-c) the implication that the subject (of the clause) used the words in quotation marks, or treat it 
as a conventional implicature, the truth conditions being given by the sentence stripped of one 
layer of quotation marks.  In the latter case, it is a requirement for felicitous utterance, but not for 
truth, that the subject mentioned used those words or a translation of them.  We will just represent 
truth conditions for sentences containing scholarly quotation as in (SQ).   
For this purpose, we introduce two operators for removing and putting quotations on 
expressions, ‘UNQ’ and ‘QUO’.  (We will find these useful in the next section on mixed quotation 
in indirect discourse as well.)  UNQ(ϕ) is the result of removing one “layer” of double-quotation 
marks from ϕ together with any square brackets surrounding material inside an outermost layer of 
quotation marks.  QUO(g) is the result of adding double quotation-marks at both ends of the 
expression g.  Thus UNQ(‘“religious” leaders are “creatures of exalted emotional sensibility”’) = 
‘religious leaders are individuals of exalted emotional sensibility’.  QUO(‘creatures of exalted 
emotional sensibility’) = ‘“creatures of exalted emotional sensibility”’.  If there are no double 
	
19 We do not assimilate this to indirect discourse.  The parenthetical ‘as Kant pointed out’ is a 
comment on what the writer is saying, which is given by the sentence sans phrase. 
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quotation marks in ϕ, then UNQ(ϕ) = ϕ.  To cut a corner, let SUB(ϕ, u, t, g) = the person or text to 
which the quoted words g in ϕ are referred relative to u and t.20 
 
(SQ) For any speaker u, time t, atomic sentence ϕ that contains scholar quotes, ϕ is true(u, t, 
English)  
iff  
(i) UNQ(ϕ) is true(u, t, English) and  
(ii) for all g such that QUO(g) occurs in ϕ, there is a g' in a language of SUB(ϕ, u, t, g) that 
is a translation of g in English and is used by (or in) SUB(ϕ, u, t, g). 
 
We treat ‘is used by’ as tenseless, that is, as equivalent to ‘has been, is, or will be used at some 
time or other by’.21 
 
5 Mixed Indirect Discourse and Attitude Attribution 
5.1 Mixed Indirect Discourse22 
We begin with a simple case of mixed indirect discourse and quotation (dubbed mixed quotation 
by Cappelen and Lepore (1997).   
 
(5a) Macomber said that he “bolted like a rabbit.”  
 
Intuitively, (5a) says that (i) Macomber said that he bolted like a rabbit and (ii) he used “bolted 
like a rabbit” (or perhaps something that translates that) in saying that of himself (given that the 
report is of his narration of what he did).  We take this to be a semantic phenomenon.  We learn 
how to interpret the appearance of quotation marks in complements of indirect discourse sentences 
in much the same way we learn how to interpret other constructions, and what we learn can be 
expressed with a rule.  The goal of this section is to state the rule.  
However, we cannot always treat the quoted expression as something the subject is saying 
of himself (it may make no reference to the subject at all).  So the gloss on (5a) cannot stand in as 	
20 There is no simple or uniform syntactic method of identifying the person to whom or text to 
which the quoted words are referred.  Sometimes it is the subject of the sentence as in (4a-b).  
Sometimes an adverbial clause provides the information, as in (4c).  Sometimes a citation to a text 
is given at the end of a sentence.  Sometimes it is given in a footnote.  Sometimes it is left entirely 
to the context. 
21 In section 5, we give a treatment for authorial brackets used in mixed quotation (as in [5c]). The 
treatment there can be adapted to scholarly quotation.  If “monstrous” operators are to be tolerated, 
the treatment in section 6 could be adapted for scholarly quotation.  It should be clear how the 
extensions go from the treatment below.  
22 Of course, scare quotes may be used in the complements of verbs of indirect discourse, but that 
has a quite different point relating to the attitude of the speaker to words appearing in the 
complement rather than to words that the subject used.  See note 5. 
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a general treatment.  In addition, (5b) shows that there may be multiple instances of quoted material 
in the complement clause.   
 
(5b) Alice said that she had “heard nonsense” compared with which that would be “as sensible 
as a dictionary.”  
 
In giving an account of how the subject of the sentence expressed what is attributed to her, we 
must keep track of the grammatical role of the various quoted expressions in the complement.  In 
fact, given that the same word can be quoted multiple times, in different roles, it is clear that merely 
saying that the word was used in the subject’s saying what she did will not convey what is intended. 
(5c) illustrates how an expression may be substituted in the quoted expression (here in 
brackets) so that the referent interpreted relative to the speaker corresponds to the referent of the 
word used by the subject of the attribution, since in indirect discourse the complement sentence is, 
except for the tense, which is governed by the event time for the main verb, interpreted relative to 
the speaker’s context (though see section 6).  
 
(5c) She said that it had been many years since “such trifles had broke across the web of [her] 
solitude.”   
 
(5d) illustrates a case in which the subject of the attribution did not use the words in quotation 
marks at all.   
 
(5d) Rochefoucauld said that jealousy “ends as soon as we pass from suspicion to certainty.”     
 
In this case, the function of the quoted expression is to indicate that these words are, or are a 
translation of, the words that the subject used.  There are, however, cases in which it looks like a 
stricter standard is called for, and so in the case of indirect discourse, as for direct discourse, we 
will distinguish between a strict and a non-strict reading.  We will begin with the non-strict reading, 
and return below to examples that suggest that a stricter reading is also sometimes intended. 
In Ludwig and Ray (1998), we offered a general account of the multiple appearances of 
quotation in indirect discourse against the background of a sententialist account of indirect 
discourse and attitude sentences, but we did not extend it to interpolations as in (5c) or to using 
translations of expressions used by the subject as in (5d).  We refine that account here (and fix a 
few things).  We make use of the two operators introduced in the previous section for removing 
and putting quotations on expressions, ‘UNQ’ and ‘QUO’.  
A sententialist account contrasts with a propositionalist account of indirect discourse (and 
attitude attributions).  On the sententialist account, the complement clause in a report of indirect 
discourse refers to the contained sentence and characterizes what the subject said in terms of a 
content equivalence relation.  On the propositionalist account, it refers to the proposition expressed 
PREPRINT		
In	The	Semantics	and	Pragmatics	of	Quotation,	eds.	Paul	Saka	and	Michael	Johnson,	Springer	2018:	99-134.	 24	
by the complement, which is said to be the same as that expressed by something the subject said.  
While we prefer the more minimalist sententialist account, after we present the refinement and 
extension of our earlier account, we will sketch how to extend the same ideas to a propositional 
account, which requires only minor modifications. 
On the sententialist account given in Ludwig and Ray (1998), we treated ‘x said that ϕ’ as 
relating x to the sentence ϕ understood relative to the speaker of the sentence and time of utterance.  
In the following, we use the event analysis of action verbs (as we did for direct discourse) in order 
to secure that the two clauses are linked in the right way.  For this purpose we use  
saying(e, t', x, UNQ(ϕ), u, t) 
to abbreviate 
e is a saying by x at t' which samesays UNQ(ϕ) understood relative to u at t 
where e is an event, x is the agent of e, t' is the time of at which x is the agent e, t is the time of 
utterance, u is the speaker, and  ‘samesays’ is a possibly context-sensitive equivalence relation that 
relates utterances and sentences.23  For present purposes it is not necessary to settle the details of 
how to interpret the samesaying relation, and, in particular, whether and how it differs from a 
generalization of the synonymy relation.   
We will develop the account in two stages.  In the first stage we ignore pronouns, and 
indexicals24 in the complement sentence that need reinterpretation across contexts, in order to 
illustrate how to accommodate multiple appearances of quoted material in the complement.  In the 
second stage, we will fix the problem this leaves us with pronouns and indexicals. This will provide 
a template for other verbs of indirect discourse. 
Stage 1. Ignoring pronouns, etc., in the complement, using the notation just introduced, 
(MID) (mixed indirect) provides an account of the truth conditions of indirect discourse using the 
verb ‘to say’ whether involving mixed quotation or not.  
 
(MID) For all speakers u, times t, sentences  , names a, [a said that  ] is true(u, t)  
iff  
there is an e, and a time t' < t, such that   
(a) saying(e, t', ref(a, u, t), UNQ( ), u, t) and 
(b) If UNQ( ) ¹  , then 	
23 Davidson used ‘samesaying’ to relate speakers (1968, pp. 140-141) in an informal rendering of 
his account of indirect discourse.  Lepore and Loewer appropriated it for use as relating utterances 
in a defense of Davidson’s paratactic account (1989, 343), and it has been pressed into service (in 
a generalization) as the equivalence relation invoked by ‘says’ between the subject’s utterance and 
whatever the complement clause refers to in indirect discourse ever since.  
24 Under ‘indexicals’ we include not just what Kaplan called pure indexicals (like ‘I’, ‘now’, 
‘today’, etc., whose referents are determined fully relative to a specification of contextual 
parameters) but also (what he called true) demonstratives (like ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘then’, ‘there’, and 
demonstrative uses of pronouns). 
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(i) there is a sentence q such that e is an utterance of q and q in the language of 
ref( , u, t) at t' in e, relative to ref(a, u, t) at t', is a translation of UNQ( ) 
understood relative to u at t,25 and 
(ii) for all expressions g, and formulas y, if   = the result of replacing ‘x’ in y 
with QUO(g), then 
(iii) a translation of g into the language of q as used by ref(a, u, t) has the same 
grammatical role in q as QUO(g) has in  . 
 
Clause (a) ensures that the subject says what the sentence in the complement says minus the first 
layer of quotation marks.  Clause (b) ensures that wherever a term appears in quotation marks in 
the complement, there is a translation of it that was used in the same role in a sentence the subject 
used to express what he did. 
Stage 2.  Pronouns and indexicals used in the complement clause, as in (13) and (14), 
 
(13) Betty said that she was “pixelated”  
(14) Betty said that I was “pixelated” 
 
make for some complication because in giving the truth conditions for (13) we want to say that 
Betty uttered, not a translation of ‘she was pixelated’, but rather of ‘I am pixelated’, using 
‘pixelated’.  Similarly, for (14), we want to say that she uttered not a translation of ‘I was pixelated’ 
but of a sentence such as ‘You are pixelated’ using ‘pixelated’.  In the case of a pronoun cross-
indexed with the subject, we want to shift specifically to a sentence in which the first-person 
pronoun is used.  This can be incorporated into (MID) by introducing in the place of ‘translation 
of UNQ( )’ a defined term, ‘index-shifted translation of  ’.   
 
(Def)  ' understood relative to x at t' is an index-shifted translation of   understood relative to u 
at t  
 iff 
  ' is a mere indexical-variant of a translation of UNQ( ) such that  (i) for every occurrence of an indexical   in   there is in the same grammatical role 
in  ' an occurrence of an indexical (or directly referring term)   such that   
understood relative to u' at t' refers to the same thing as   understood relative to u 
at t 	
25 We let ‘understood relative to u at t’ do double duty, fixing both interpretation of the sentence 
and contextual parameters.  See the discussion below of the use of words in complements that 
aren’t strictly in English.  Ultimately, in a truth-theoretic semantics, we would wish to introduce 
the speech act the speaker performs as another contextual parameter, in which case we could add 
a further relativization to the use of the sentence in the speech act itself. 
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(ii) and if   is co-indexed with the subject position, then   is the first-person pronoun 
agreeing in number with     
 
To say that  ' is a mere indexical-variant of a translation of UNQ( ) is just to say that but for 
possibly these indexical shifts,  ' does not differ from a translation of UNQ( ).  By way of 
example, suppose when A greets you this morning, A says, "You were late for a very important 
date yesterday". Then 'I am late for a very important date today' understood relative to you and 
yesterday is an index-shifted translation relative to A today.  Together with the definition of 
‘UNQ(x)’ this handles (5c). 
For a propositionalist account of the function of the complement, we can replace (a) with 
(a¢). 
 
 (a¢) saying(e, a, ref([that UNQ(ϕ)], u, t)) …  
 
We relativize the reference of [that UNQ(ϕ)] to speaker and time because the proposition it 
designates is determined in general relative to the interpretation of UNQ(ϕ) relative to the context 
of utterance.  
The approach above extends naturally to cases involving quantification into the 
complement clause, as in 
 
 There is something such that Galileo said that it moves. 
 
On a sententialist account, we want to say that this is true just in case an assertion of Galileo’s 
samesays a completion of the sentence form ‘x moves’, i.e., a sentence in which ‘x’ is replaced by 
a singular referring term.26 However, we must provide a way of generalizing this requirement that 
allows for the possibility that there is no completion in English of the sentence form ‘x moves’ that 
samesays with any sentence that Galileo uttered. This can be done by providing a satisfaction 
clause for open sentences along the lines of (MIDQ) (mixed indirect quantification). 
 (MIDQ) For all sequences f, all speakers u, times t, formulas  x, names a, [a said that  x] 
is satisfied by f relative to u and t iff ... 
The remainder of this condition would be just as in (MID), but in place of ' ' we will put ' *' 
which latter would be shorthand for 
the result of replacing ‘x’ in   with a constant   in a language that extends the language 
of   only by the addition of  , and in which   refers to f(‘x’). 	
26 We give an account for the sententialist view of the referent of the complement.  For the 
propositionalist, it is just a matter of quantifying into a complex term that refers to a proposition, 
and so relativizing the referent of the complement to the object assigned to the variable (relativized 
to speaker and time). 
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Clearly, the approach could be generalized to formulas with any number of free variables. It should 
be noted that attitude attributions, with the exception of present-tense attributions, involve 
quantification into temporal argument positions in the complement, and so are to be treated in 
accordance with the account of quantification given here. 
As Cappelen and Lepore have noted (1997), in reporting what people say, we can put words 
they use in quotation marks in the complement of indirect discourse even though they misuse or 
misspell them or just use expressions that are not words in the language we are speaking at all, as 
in (15). 
 
(15) Nicola said that his father is a “philtosopher”27 
 
This is a case in which a stricter standard for what sentence the subject uttered is called for, for the 
intention is to indicate that Nicola used ‘philtosopher’, not just any word that means the same as 
the speaker’s use of it, to express being a philosopher (or whatever she expresses by it).  For the 
strict reading, we need only to replace (iii) in (MID) with (iii*): 
 
(iii*) an occurrence of g as used by ref(a, u, t) has the same grammatical role in j as QUO(g) 
has in  . 
 
The result of applying UNQ to the complement sentence in (18) is ‘his father is a philtosopher’.  
That is not a sentence of English, but the account requires only that it be interpreted relative to the 
use by the attributor in the utterance context and the subject at the event time.  (What if Nicola 
didn’t mean anything very definite by ‘philtosopher’?  See the discussion below of nonsense words 
in complements of indirect discourse verbs.) 
We also sometimes intend to convey that specific words were used rather than synonyms 
or translations of them quite apart from cases in which we wish to convey that someone used a 
misspelling of a word (or a neologism or a malaprop).  For example, consider this exchange: 
 
A: Brian said that he was allergic to “gorse.” 
B: I heard he said he was allergic to “furze.” 
A: No, he definitely said that he was allergic to “gorse.”   
 
This makes sense even if A and B both know that ‘gorse’ and ‘furze’ are synonyms.  In this case, 
we invoke the strict reading to capture the sense of the exchange.  	
27 Is this an instance of scare quotes? Not if the intention is to attribute the word to Nicola.  We 
can use scare quotes in indirect discourse without there being any suggestion that the subject used 
them: John said that he was into “adult films”, though that is not what he called them.  However, 
there may be a kind of dual use of the quotation marks when one both wants to attribute words to 
someone in indirect discourse and to distance oneself from them. 
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What about a case in which someone uses a nonsense term (a term that didn’t mean 
anything in the mouth of the subject of the sentence), as in (16)? 
 
(16) Nicola said that her father is a “jabberwocky”. 
 
Here we intend the strict reading.  These cases too can be accommodated as long as we allow that 
‘her father is a jabberwocky’ can stand in the samesaying relation to some utterance of Nicola and 
allow translation to relate expressions that are not fully meaningful.  (iii*) requires that the 
particular nonsense word in the complement be used rather than another, so no additional 
difficulties arise about getting the right target.  Nothing in the account requires sentences that 
appear in complements to be fully meaningful or to have propositional content that determines 
truth conditions for them. 
A question arises about how to treat iterated indirect discourse as in (5e).28 
 
(5e) Professor Elugardo said that Williams James said that religious leaders are “creatures of 
exalted emotional sensibility.”  
 
The question is whether this should be treated as saying that Professor Elugardo said something 
that is the same in content as (17) or (18). 
 
(17)   Williams James said that religious leaders are “creatures of exalted emotional sensibility.” 
(18)   Williams James said that religious leaders are creatures of exalted emotional sensibility. 
 
On the first reading, we are saying (roughly) that Professor Elugardo said that  <William James 
said something whose content was that religious leaders are creatures of exalted emotional 
sensibility and he [James] used ‘creatures of exalted emotional sensibility’ in the appropriate 
position> (the angle brackets indicate the scope of the complement clause).  On the second reading, 
we are saying (roughly) that Professor Elugardo said something that is the same in content as (18) 
while he [Elugardo] used ‘creatures of exalted emotional sensibility’ in an appropriate position.   
Our account says that (5e) attributes to Elugardo an assertion the same in content as (18) 
in which he used ‘creatures of exalted emotional sensibility’ (or a translation) in the grammatical 
role in which it appears in the complement of (5e)—this is the second interpretation.  To get the 
first reading, we would use (19). 
 
(19) Professor Elugardo said that Williams James said that religious leaders are ““creatures of 
exalted emotional sensibility””. 
 	
28 This example was raised by Ray Elugardo as an objection to our earlier account. 
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However, surely it is more natural to give (5e) the first interpretation on which the words are 
attributed to James and not Elugardo.  One reason it may seem more natural is that we already 
know that William James used that phrase.  Another is that the focus is on what James said, so that 
when quotation marks appear in the complement of the embedded attribution (in contrast to the 
NP of the embedded attribution) we may be inclined to take the speaker to be intending to convey 
something about the words with which James said it.  But we can also get the other (second) 
reading for iterated indirect mixed quotation. Consider (20). 
 
(20) Though she said that he put it more politely, Sue told me that John complained that he was 
being “jerked around by his asshole boss” 
 
In this case, we interpret the speaker of (20) as intending to attribute to Sue the use of ‘jerked 
around by his asshole boss’ rather than to John.  We react to (5e) and (20) by trying to figure out 
what the speaker could be intending, and we use whatever knowledge we have to help us arrive at 
a reasonable interpretation.   
We think it is doubtful there is much of a practice attached to iterated mixed quotation.  We 
have only come across it in examples proposed by philosophers intended to test our account.  Most 
likely, we interpret these on the fly using whatever information we can to divine the intentions of 
the speaker.  If this is right, then we are not faced so much with the question of what interpretation 
the rules of the language give to (5e), but how to extend them to cover such cases.  For this purpose, 
we recommend extending our account since it provides a systematic way of disambiguating the 
different readings speakers may intend.  One could develop an alternative which made (5e) literally 
express the first reading by conditionalizing on whether   in (MID) was itself an instance of 
indirect discourse, and giving a different treatment of embedded complements when it was, but 
this would make certain things we might want to say using iterated mixed quotation inexpressible 
by any literal interpretation.  (Of course, the quotation marks in these cases can be interpreted 
strictly or non-strictly.)  
 
5.2 Mixed Attitude Attributions 
The case of mixed attitude attributions as illustrated in (5f) is curious.   
 
(5) (f) She thought that it was curious that that “thin, proud man” should have had “that little, 
sharp woman for a mother!” 
 
In the case of direct attributions of thought, we treated the quotation term in the complement as 
giving the content of the thought interpreted relative to the context of the thought (the thinker and 
time of the thought).  In indirect attitude attributions in non-mixed cases, it would seem that the 
difference is that the sentence in the complement is interpreted relative to the speaker rather than 
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the subject and time of the thought.  What purpose could interpolation of quotation terms in 
attributions of thought on analogy with mixed indirect discourse serve?   
It is clear that mixed indirect attitude attributions are intended to provide a more fine-
grained characterization of the thought that is being attributed.  In the case of direct attributions of 
thought, we suggested that we aim to use a sentence a translation of which the subject would be 
disposed to use to express her thought.  With this in mind, we can make sense of the point of mixed 
indirect quotation, namely, to indicate that the thinker would be disposed to use translations of the 
material quoted in the complement in corresponding positions in announcing the thought in a 
sentence.  Using (MID) as a template, we can give the following account in (MIA) (mixed indirect 
attitude) for attitude attributions, where we replace the quantifier over events with a quantifier over 
states.  (This is given for the verb ‘thought’ but as above it provides a template that can be extended 
to other propositional attitude verbs.) 
 
(MIA) For all speakers u, times t, sentences  , names a,  [a thought that  ] is true(u, t, English)  
iff  
there is a state s and a time t' < t, such that 
(a) thinks(s, t', ref(a, u, t), UNQ( ), u, t) and  
(b) If UNQ( ) ¹  , then 
(i) ref(a, u, t) is disposed to express s at t' using a sentence q that relative to ref(a, 
u, t) at t' is an index-shifted translation of UNQ( ) understood relative to u at 
t and 
(ii) for all expressions g, and formulas y, if   = the result of replacing ‘x’ in y 
with QUO(g), then 
(iii) a translation of g into the language of the sentence q that ref(a, u, t) is disposed 
to use has the same grammatical role in q as QUO(g) has in  . 
 
As above, there is a propositionalist version of clause (a) and we can make provision for a more 
strict use of quotation marks as well so that what is require is an index-shifted version of the 
sentence q itself. 
 
6 Monstrous Operators 
Kaplan (1989) defined a ‘monstrous operator’ as one that shifts context of evaluation away from 
the context of utterance.  Lepore and Cappelen (1997; 2003) have suggested that mixed quotation 
can involve this kind of shift.  Here is an example from their 1997 paper: 
 
Mr. Greenspan said he agreed with Labor Secretary R.B. Reich “on quite a lot of things”.  




In the second sentence, the ‘us’ in quotation marks is clearly intended to be interpreted relative to 
the context of Greenspan’s utterance rather than the context of the report.  The practice of replacing 
pronouns and indexicals in quoted material in complements so that when interpreted relative to the 
speaker’s context the referent comes out correct is illustrated in (5c).  In light of this, one might 
dismiss examples like these as careless and ungrammatical, an example of changing from indirect 
to direct quotation in midsentence and failing to notice.   
Without trying to settle this issue about usage, it is interesting to ask from the theoretical 
standpoint how such a practice could be accommodated in a semantics for a language. Take as a 
sample (21), 
 
(21) She said that “of all of us” she was “the least happy camper” 
 
where we assume that the speaker of (21) is not among those that the subject was talking about.  
We want to have the speaker say something to the effect: 
 
(22) She said that of all of them she was the least happy camper and 
she used a sentence that translates ‘of all of us I am the least happy camper’ in saying that.  
 
(MID) does not give us (22) because its clause (a) requires the speaker to say that she said that of 
all us she was the least happy camper, and this requires the speaker to include herself among those 
referred to, contrary to our assumption.   
The first thing to do is to transform the complement sentence into a sentence in which 
indexicals in quotation marks are replaced by bracketed indexicals that corefer, taken relative to 
the speaker’s context, with those they replace taken relative to the subject’s context.  We use the 
following definition. 
 
(Def)  ' relative to x at t is an index-shifted transform of   relative to y at t'  
iff 
 ' is a mere indexical variant of   such that  
for all   such that QUO( ) appears in  , for every occurrence of any indexical or 
demonstrative d in   (unless in authorial brackets), in  ' there is in the same grammatical 
role as d in   an occurrence of an indexical (or directly referring term) d' in authorial 
brackets such that d' understood relative to x at t refers to the same thing as d understood 
relative to y at t'.  
 
Then we replace (a) in (MID) with (a*): 
 




(a*) there is an    such that    relative to u at t is an index-shifted transform of   
relative to ref(a, u, t) at t' and saying(e, t', ref(a, u, t), UNQ(  ), u, t)  
 
For the rest, we replace ‘ ’ with ‘  ’ in clause (b). 
 
7 Translation Practices 
Before concluding, it is worth taking a glance at our practices in translating quotation, which raise 
some questions about the account presented here.  When it is pure quotation that is in view, we 
translate the quotation marks but not the expression enclosed within it.  (This is support for the 
view that quotation marks are not semantically inert but a distinct device in the language, and it is 
evidence against the proper name theory for which, as remarked, what is interior to the quotation 
remarks is nothing more than spelling.)  Strikingly, however, translations for other forms of 
quotation, direct and mixed, often do not preserve the identity of the material in quotation marks.  
When we translate dialogue in fiction or in reporting, we typically translate the sentences that 
appear in quotation marks as well.  Similarly, when we translate mixed quotation, we typically 
translate the expressions that appear in quotation marks as well.  How is this compatible with the 
view that at the core of all of these uses of quotation marks is pure quotation?   
The answer is that ordinary translation does not aim to preserve faithfully every aspect of 
meaning.  Sometimes this is because there is no best fit between the expressions in the target and 
home language.  We can at best paraphrase the German ‘torschlusspanik’ into English as ‘the fear 
of diminishing opportunities as one ages’, because we have no one-word equivalent.  But in other 
cases the trouble is that in preserving certain aspects of meaning we fail to convey something 
important about the function of the word or sentence in the original.  The most literal translation 
of a poem may do a very bad job of conveying the literary qualities of the original.  In other cases, 
the problem has to do with a function internal to the conventional rules for using the expressions.  
Tyler Burge (1978) pointed out that in cases of self-reference like ‘This sentence is false’ we do 
not aim, when we translate it into French or German, to preserve the referent of the subject term 
to the English sentence.  What we would lose in this case is the fact that the subject term is used 
to refer to the sentence in which it appears.  In a context in which we are interested in the 
phenomenon of self-reference, it is more important to preserve that in the translation than the 
reference to the English sentence.  Burge noted that the same thing applies to translation of 
dialogue in novels.  A translation of War and Peace into English in which all the Russian dialogue 
was left untranslated would not sell very many copies.  Dialogue is what we called quasi-use 
quotation.  For it to function as intended, the audience must understand the expressions contained 
in quotation marks (so far as possible—dialogue can contain nonsense words too).  Preserving this 
function is more important in translation that preserving reference to the words that appear in the 
quotation marks.  Furthermore, given the account of (non-strict) direct discourse we have given, 
the original sentence and its translation will still share the same truth value.  These remarks carry 
over straightforwardly to direct attitude attributions and to mixed quotation.  Thus, the fact that 
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reference to words in quotation marks, other than in pure quotation, is not preserved in translation 
is not a counterexample to the analyses offered above. 
 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued for a unified account of quotation devices in natural languages.  We 
have not argued that there is one analysis of all uses of quotation marks, but rather that though 
quotation is polysemous it is unified in that every form of quotation can be seen as making use of 
a core function of quotation marks, namely, their use in pure quotation.  The general rule for pure 
quotation  
 
(GQ) For any expression f, QUOT(f) refers to f. 
 
is a remarkably simple and clear device that exploits the fact that expression types have tokens by 
which we recognize them.  Uses of quotation that extend beyond pure quotation have two features 
in common.29  First, the material appearing in quotation marks is intended to be understood and 
that it is understood is essential to the function that such quotations play in communication 
(modulo a strict form of direct and indirect discourse), even though this does not always involve 
the expressions contributing their extensional properties to fixing truth conditions for the sentences 
in which they appear.  Second, they appeal to a relation born to the expression appearing in 
quotation marks that plays a role in determining the truth conditions of the sentences in which they 
appear.  Thus, in all of these uses, a reference to the expression in quotation marks is made in 
relation to which other things are characterized, such as some utterance someone has made or a 
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